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CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER-EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF STATUTE
OR ORDINANCE ON CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-Derendant was convicted of
the crime of negligent homicide and appealed, alleging that the Louisiana
statute,1 making violation of a statute or ordinance presumptive evidence of
criminal negligence, was repugnant to the due process clauses of the state and ·
federal constitutions. Held, affirmed. The effect of the statute is merely to

1 "Negligent homicide is the killing of a human being by criminal negligence.
The violation of a statute or ordinance shall be considered only as presumptive evidence of such negligence." La. Crim. Stat. Ann. (1943) Art. 740-32.

RECENT DECISIONS

shift the burden of introducing evidence of one element of the crime charged:
that of criminal negligence. The presumption does not operate as a prima facie
presumption of guilt of the crime -and the state must still prove every element of
the offense. State v. Nix, (La. 1947) 31 S. (2d) I.
The decisions are not in harmony as to the effect that the violation of a
statute or ordinance will have upon the question of criminal neglige.p.ce or if
the question of negligence has any significance at all. The common law definition of involuntary manslaughter is unintentional killing during the coil1!1I1ission
of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony,. or in doing a lawful act in an
unlawful manner. 2 Some jurisdictions adhere to the_ idea that if the death is
caused by the commission of an unlawful act, all that need be proved is the
violation of the law and that it was the proximate cause of the death, 8 the question of negligence being immaterial. 4 Other jurisdictions hold that criminal
negligence is necessary to uphold a conviction of involuntary manslaughter,
even if death is caused during the commission of an unlawful act. In states
requiring criminal negligence, one view is that violation of a statute is in and
of itself criminal negligence; 5 another that the statutory violation makes the
defendant prima facie guilty of such negligence. 6 Some jurisdictions distinguish
between unlawful acts that are malum in se and those that are malum prohibitum.
As to statutes malum in se, not amounting to a felony, the common law approach is adhered to and if the defendant causes death while engaged in the
violation of such a statute, the question of negligence is immaterial. 7 Violation
of statutes malum prohibitum are approached in a different manner and the
question of negligence becomes important. The violation in itself is not enough
on which to predicate manslaughter, unless accompanied by criminal negligence. 8 The state must show more than a statutory violation: it must show
that the violation was accompanied by conduct which would be deemed reckless,9 or dangerous,1° or committed with reckless disregard for the life or the safety
of others. 11 If such conduct is shown in addition to the violation of the statute,
it is sufficient to warrant a finding of criminal negligence.12 These states which
differentiate between acts malum in se and malum prohibitum say that violations
2

40 C.J.S., Homicide, § 55.
Kearns v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 745, 49 S.W. (2d) I009 (1932); Massie
v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 883, 15 S.E. (2d) 30 (1941).
4
People v. Wardell, 291 Mich. 276, 289 N.W. 328 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Gill, 120 Pa. Super. 22, 182 A. I03 (1935) (the court said that if the death is
caused by an act forbidden by law it constitutes involuntary manslaughter regardless of
whether the defendant was negligent). See' also Commonwealth v. Bergen, 134 Pa.
Super. 62, 4-A. (2d) 164 (1939); Thompson v. State, 131 Ala. 18, 31 S. 725 (1902).
5
State v. Mclvor, 31 Del. 123, 111 A. 616 (1920).
6
Steffani v. State, 45 Ariz. 2IO, 42 P. (2d) 615 (1935).
7
People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N.W. 177 (1921).
8
Thiede v. State, 106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W. 570 (1921) (acts malum prohibitum
and those malum in se clearly distinguished, and difference illustrated).
9
State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 (1933); Potter v. State, 162 Ind.
213, 70 N.E. 129- (1904).
10
Estell v. State, 51 N.J.L. 182, 17 A. 118 (1888).
11
State v. Reitze, 86 N.J.L. 407, 92 A. 576 (1914).
12
State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P. (2d) 457 (1939).
8
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of the latter type of statutes may be used as evidence of criminal negligence. It
has_ been held that it is not erroneous to read to the jury the code provisions
violated, as such provisions may have an evidentiary bearing on determining the
question of criminal negligence; but the jury should be told that the violation
does not of necessity establish this negligence.13 The violation of the statute may
serve only as a basis on which criminal negligence may be found. 14 Negligence,
if it is to be criminal, must be of a greater degree than that which is the basis of
liability in civil suits. Thus, as to acts malum prohibitum, if a court is to instruct
that the violation of a statute is in itself negligence, it must go further and point
out the elements necessary to raise simple negligence to criminal negligence or
else commit reversible error.15 There is another possible view, seemingly followed by at least one state, that no distinction is to be drawn between the
type of statute violated: violation of any statute is negligence but such negligence
is not enough to establish the willful, wanton, and reckless conduct necessary to
warrant a finding of criminal negligence unless additional factors are introduced
by the state to establish such conduct.16 It is interesting to note that, in the
principal case, the court recognizes that the code provision is a legislative rejection of a prior decision of the court,17 in which it held that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is of itself criminal negligence. While the principal case
in upholding the code provision allows a presumption of criminal negligence
in favor of the state, it holds that this is to be interpreted as 'merely shifting the
burden of introducing evidence. This is a decided break with the former doctrine as set forth by the Louisiana court and with the states which hold that
the question of negligence is immaterial or that the violation is of itself criminal
negligence or prima facie criminal negligence. While the interpretation does
not go so far as to say that the violation has nothing but an evidentiary effect,
it is only slightly removed from the decisions which advance this view.18

C. E. Becraft
18

State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 A. 927 (19IO).
Cutshall v. State, 191 Miss. 764, 4 S. (2d) 289 (1941).
15
Wells v. State, 162 Miss. 617, 139 S. 859 (1932).
16 Commonwealth v. Arone, 265 Mass. 128, 163 N.E. 758 (1928).
17 State v. Wilbanks, 168 La. 862, 123 S. 600 (1929). Here the court said, at p.
866, ''We conclude, and we do not think the question open to controversy, that
where a person operates his automobile ••• in violation of a penal statute he is guilty
of culpable and criminal negligence. • • . The statute imposes a penalty for operating
an automobile at night without lights, and its violation amounts to something more
than simple negligence arising from some act of mere omission of duty. The act of
violation is within and of itself criminal and culpable negligence."
18 There is a diversity of opinion as to whether the violation of an ordinance
will be enough on which to predicate manslaughter. There is authority to the effect
that the violation of a valid ordinance falls within the meaning of the term "unlawful
act" and hence the issue of negligence does not enter the picture. Hayes v. State,
II Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (1912). Opposing authority treat the violation of an
ordinance in the same manner in which many jurisdictions treat the violation of a
statute malum prohibitum. State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1134, 196 N.W. 82 (1923).
Here, unless elements such as utter carelessness or a reckless disregard of the safety of
others, which go to make up criminal negligence, are present, the violation is not
sufficient to support a manslaughter charge. State v. Thomlinson, 209 Iowa 555, 228
N.W. So (1929).
14

